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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
JERRY JOE MEDINA 
Appellant-Petitioner 
vs . 
GERALD L. COOK, WARDEN et, al., 
Respondentf s . 
Case No, C87-7241 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Appellant-Petitioner hereby appeals from the Memorandum 
decision of the Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable 
Frank G. Noel, Presiding. Pursuant to Rule 65 B (i) 10 of the 
Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT SHOWING NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Appellant-Petitioner filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas 
Corpus Pursuant to Utah R. Cov. Pro. 65 B (i) 10 and 28 U.S.C. 
2254 Alternate Writ of Error in Corum Nobis, alleging Newly Dis-
covered Evidence that the convicting testimony, and evidence at 
trial, was tainted false, and contaminated and a fabrication of 
the facts that rose to a level of deprivation of due process and 
a fiar trial and by the same logic Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel and Prosecutorial Misconduct. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
POINT I . . . Did Appellants Court appointed trial counsel commit 
reversible error by failing to conduct substantially adequate 
investigation both factual and legal that she chose to employ 
at trial? And did this prejudice Appellants defense and work 
to an actual and substantial disadvantage depriving Appellant 
of due process and a fiar trial and effective assistance at 
each critifal stage of the proceedings against the Appellant? 
By Counsel failing to investigate the following herein 
presented A, B, C,: 12 
A. Did Counsel fail to conduct an independent investigation 
to know and ascertain if the governments charges were true, 
being that if in fact the bullet the victim allegedly died 
from was found in the Appellants car as he was charged with? 
B. Did Counsel fail to adequately investigate the sole witness? 20 
Was Counsels failure to investigate and suppress the false 
testimony of a convict with a known vendetta ineffective? 21 
D. Was Counsel further ineffective by not objecting, recording, 
and preserving for Appeal, raeially biased and prejudicial 
closing arguments that also falsely insinuated previous heinous 
murder crimes? . • 24 
Was Appellant Counsel ineffective at a critical stage? 24 
POINT II . . . Did the Appellant allege Prosecutorial Misconduct 
that denied Appellant of due process and fair trial? 25 
DETERMINITIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
PAGE 
CRIMINAL LAW 46.4 COUNSEL INEFFECTIVENESS 
Strategic choices made after thorough investigation of 
facts and law relevant to plausible options are virtu-
ally unchallengible,while strategic choice!s made after 
less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely 
to the extent that reasonable professional judgements sup-
port the limitations or investigations or in other words 
Counsel has a duty to make a reasonable decision that makes 
particular investigation unnecessary. 
HABEAS CORPUS 85.2 (2) 28 U.S.C. 2254 CONST. AMEND. 6 
Habeas Corpus Petitioner has burden of persuation to demon-
strate the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel and 
not only the possibility of prejudice but it worked to an 
actual and substantial disadvantage, but if the Petitioner 
successfully satisfies such a burden the Writ of Habeas 
Corpus must be granted unless the State can prove that 
Counsels, Ineffectiveness was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
CRIMINAL LAW 641.13 (1) U.S.C.A. CONST. k^\ rD. 6 
When defense counsel discerns only one plausible line of 
defense to serve his clients interests, effective counsel 
is obligated to conduct reasonable substantial investiga-
tions into that line of defense before proceeding to trial 
and failure to perform substantial investigation is clear 
example of breach of duty to investigate, and further when 
an attorney fails to conduct substantial investigation 
intoany of his clients plausible lines of defense the 
attorney has equally failed to render effective assistance 
of counsel to a criminal defendant and also when counsel 
choose's among several plausible lines of defense excluding 
others for no strategic reason. 
CRIMINAL LAW 641.13 (6) U.S.C.A. CONST. AMEND. 6. 
A particular decision not to investigate must be directly 
assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances ap-
plying a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgements, 
and at a minimum counsel has a duty to interview potential 
witness's and to make an independant investigation of the 
facts and circumstances of the case and if Petitioners 
Counsel fails to contact potential alibi witness's and to 
locate witness's who could have corroborrated Petitioners 
testimony, counsels judgements were not professionable 
reasonable. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged on 4-1-84 with Criminal Homicide in the 
Second Degree under 76-5-203 Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended, 
in connection with 1984 in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Appellant was tried before a Jury and found guilty of Second 
Degree Homicide in the Third Judicial District Court and was sen-
tenced to 5-years to Life at the Utah State Prison by the Hon-
orable J. Dennis Fredricks, Presiding, and is currently serving 
that sentence. 
Appellant submits that the cause or orgin of the Homicide is 
still unclear, only that the charges of Criminal Homicide arose 
out of two neighboring apartment buildings where two different 
parties were underway, located at 320 West 800 ~th m Salt Lake 
City, Utah. 
Appellant had gotten off work at approximately 10:00 p.m. this 
same evening, which Appellant worked just a half block up the street 
at the Union Pacifice Railroad at the time as a Pressure Systems 
Specialist Mechanic on locomotives, which Appellant: had been em-
ployed for the Union Pacific for approximately 11-years at the time 
of this occurance (Tr. of Trial P.442). 
Appellant Mr. Medina who has strongly maintained his inno-
cense, testified at trial that he (Appellant)and his cousin Leonard 
Fernandez had left this party between the early morning hours of 
3:30-4:00 a.m. being approximately 30-minutes before the homicide 
occured at 4:20 a.m. (Tr. of Trial P.18, 119,189,459) which was 
corroborrated by all witness's accounts who testified that could 
remember when the Appellant had left this party (Tr.of Trial P.119, 
123,210) which even the alleged sole eyewitness Ricky Myers even 
corroborated by testifying that: 
"When everybody started leaving the party between 3:30 -
Jerry Medina also left, and I didnft see him anymore after 
that, I would have to say that much" (Tr. of Trial P.233). 
Appellants claim that he had left approximately 30-minutes 
before the Homicide can further be corroborrated by the fact that 
at the time of the homicide all six (6) eyewitness's who talked to 
police and identified the cars and people they seen leaving the 
scene never identified the Appellant or his car, which these 
identifications were consistant, accurate and identical (See Police -
Reports No. 84025540 P. 1, 7, 10, 12, and Tr. of Trial P. 43, 51). 
At the time of trial the States convicting evidence and testi-
mony consisted of three (3) witness's and closing arguments being; 
(A) Detective John "hnson, the arresting officer. 
(B) Ricky Myers, the alleged sole eyewitness. 
(C) Eli Archuletta, a inmate at the Utah State Prison and 
(D) Closing arguments by the Prosecutor that mis-stated the 
faces and evidence and were inflamatory and prejudicial and 
insinuated previous heinous murder crimes. 
(A) Appellant submits in the first instance, Detective Johnson 
testified at trial that: 
He (Detective Johnson) physiciaily conducted a search of the 
Appellants (Mr. Medina) car and found a .38 Calibur bullet 
and that the car he searched was a 1974 Black Chevrolet 
Monte Carlo (Tr. of Trial P. 321) and that he Appellants 
Monte Carlo was parked out in the street in the circle 
(Catherine Circle Street) with numerous other cars (Tr. of -
Trial 325) and that there were a couple vehicles also parked 
in the driveway (Tr. of Trial P. 316) that he (Detective 
Johnson) did not need no key's to enter the car because it 
was unlocked and that there were no alcoholic beverage con-
tainers in the car, either full or empty (Tr. of Trial P.317, 
319)- [1] 
Appellant Mr. Medina asserts that Detective John Johnson as-
sumed upon his search that this Black 1974 Chevrolet Monte Carlo 
belonged to the Appellant Mr. Medina, where in fact the car belonged 
to a friend of the neighbors named Mark Velarde who would of testi-
fied so at the time of Trial (EXHIBIT 2) and in further support 
Appellant submits the foregoing for this Courts consideration: 
(1) That Mr. Medina's car was a 1972 Chevelle Malibu that has no 
resemblance in any way, shape, or form to a 1974 Monte Carlo 
and does not haVe the words "Chevrolet" or "Monte Carlo" any-
where on the car for identificational purposes (Tr . of Trial -
P. 446). 
(2) Mr. Medina's car was half painted grey primer from doing repairs 
and auto-body work on the car resulting from an automobile ac-
cident in a snowstorm after hitting "black ice" a few months 
previously (Tr. of Trial P. 449). 
(3) Appellants car was parked in the driveway, not In the street, 
where Appellant "pulled up into the house" and "parked in front 
of the house" "in the driveway" and further Appellants car doors 
were "locked"" (Tr. of Trial P. 129, 489, 461). 
(4) Further its undisputed that Appellants car the night of the 
homicide was littered with numerous beverage (aLcohol) the 
evening and Appellant drinking in his car upon Leaving a bar 
and the Najera party (Tr. of Trial P. 129, 445, 454). 
(5) Further there were only two cars owned in the Fernandez household 
and only room for both of these cars in the Fernandez driveway 
and both the Fernandez car and the Appellants car were in the 
driveway at the time of Appellants arrest, which Detective John-
son testified he seen both cars in the driveway (Tr. of Trial -
316) by testifying he seen more than one car in the driveway. 
Appellant Mr. Medina asserts that he was not present at the 
time this car was searched, nor did he witness or made aware or 
participate, further Appellant (Mr. Medina) was totally unaware that 
a bullet had allegedly been found at this time, and was not made 
aware of this fact until after his (Appellant) arrest when he bailed 
out of Jail, wherein he was notified by Court appointed trial counsel 
Francis Palacios, where he (Mr Medina) had informed Counsel of these 
fa^ts, and also that he didn't know how a .38 could of been found in 
his car, and seen the bullet for the first time at trial (Tr. of -
Trial P. 487) (2) Thu^ Appellant alleges Counsels performance 
was deficient and prejudicial because trial counsel not only made 
[1] By all officers accounts who accurately identified the vehicle 
by make, model and year further stated the car searched was a Black 
1974 Chevrolet Monte Carlo. 
- See Police Reports No. 84025c>4 Page 10, 21, (EXHIBIT NO. 10) "one 
live round of .38 Special Ammunition was found on the passenger side 
floor board of a car that was a Black 1974 Chevrolet: Monte Carlo" 
- See also testimony of Detective Leary; "the car Detective Johnson 
qparrhpH wa «* a Rlark MonfP Carlo"- (Tr. of Trial P. 1S 7 ^  . 
no atte pt to investigate or explain or contradict this discre-
pancy involving two different car's resulting in the use of this 
.38 bullet, and also being the only evidence used against the 
Appellant, but then Counsel further stipulated to its admission 
(Tr. of Trial P. 495).Thus resulting a manifest injustice by having 
the Jury consider convicting false evidence it shouldn' t have which 
relieved the State of having to prove itfs case beyond a reasonable 
doubt and deprived the Appellants defense the opportunity to chal-
lenge on cro&s examination, which Appellant also states he never 
heard this discrepancy during trial do to at the time Appellant was 
preoccupied with how the bullet could of possibly of bee-n* :Pn his 
(Appellants) car in the first place, and feelg both TTi^l £tid 
Appellate Counsel should of caught this erro. , which Appellant never 
really knew about this error until after Direct Appeal when Appellant 
obtained his copies of the Trial Transcripts and Police Reports. 
(B) Witness Ricky Myers, alleged sole eye witness; 
Appellant Mr. Medina alleges the testimony of this States wit-
ness and alleged sole adverse eye witness was perjured, tainted and 
inaccurate for good reason by Ricky Myers own admission and testi-
mony, in that at the initial confrontation at the Preliminary Hearing 
[2] The record clearly shows that Appellant was never present during 
the search of the vehicle in question being a 1974 Monte Carlo, 
and further the Appellants assertion he relayed all information 
to Counsel in not having knowledge of how the bullet got in his 
car and not being present is corroborrated by Counsel's and 
Detective Leary's testimony, 
See: Detective Leary testimony that: "No" me (Detective Leary) 
and Jerry Medina were not present when Detective Johnson con-
ducted the search of the vehicle nor idd we participate, after I 
Detective Leary) remained with Jerry (in the patrol car) while 
Detective Johnson conducted the search of the vehicle which was a 
Black Monte Carlo and I wasn't made aware that the .38 bullet was 
found until after Mr. Medina's arrest (Tr. of Trial P.354,357). 
See: 
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Then this witness Ricky Myers admitted to meeting with the 
Prosecutor Michael Christiansen and discussing this Preliminary 
Testimony and matters and recieving additional facts and details 
about the case from this Prosecutor and Police shortly before trial 
(Tr. of Trial P. 267) where then after this contact with the Prose-
cutor shortly before trial and after discussing Ricky's testimony 
Ricky's testimony radically altered and took on a different charac-
terzation and was completely different in that then, Ricky Myers 
testified that: 
Then he (Ricky Myers) was not any 
time of the homicide and also aft 
ecutor he could also remember who 
Appellant at the time of the homi 
was no longer to the Appellant, a 
member seeing the Appellant shoot 
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Trial P. 244, 245, 249) 
size of the large lO^-inch 
revolver he seen the Appellant use just 6-months earlier 
(Tr. of Trial P. 252) which then this lapse of memory re-
sulted in the Prosecutor stuffing on the Appellant in front 
of the Jury the smallest manufactured ,38 revolver in the 
Continental United States being a 5-shot stainless steel 
Smith & Wesson "Flyweight Special" with a 1/2-inch barrel and 
overall length of 4^-inches being a little bit larger than a 
derringer and less that half as large as the revolver pre-
viously described by Ricky (Tr. of Trial P. 474, 476). 
Appellant alleges Ricky Myers trial testimony was perjured 
from start to finish because Ricky testified at trial that: 
He (Ricky) had been in the Army and had an Honorable Discharge 
from the Army and that at the time of the homicide he was 
gainfully employed with a firm in Omaha, Nebraska called "New 
Energy Consultants" (Tr. of Trial P. 231, 272). Further that 
he drove long haul semi trucks for a living and was a truck 
driver and in the process of starting his own trucking company 
and firm, insinuating he was worth the possible millions it 
would take to undergo such a financial undertaking and that 
he had only been to Utah once before as a child 20-years earlier 
(Tr. of Trial P. 218, 223) and had arrived at the party and 
place of the homicide at 12": 30-Midnite and had never met the 
victim George Givens before the evening of the homicide (Tr. -
of Trial P. 231, 221) and that he Ricky Myers had never been 
convicted or arrested of any crimes or felonies, and that when 
he seen the Appellant Mr. Medina shoot the victim that he 
(Ricky) ran and walked to the Greyhound Bus Depot and waited 
4 or 5 minutes then called the Police (Tr. of Trial P. 339,257) 
But Appellant submits all to the contrary he has learned 
through investigation and informed sources that: 
That it was showed at trial that Ricky was never in the Army 
and that no such place of employment existed called "New 
Energy Consultants in Omaha, Nebraska (Tr. of Trial P. 424, 
494). Further Appellant ran a check on Ricky Myers drivers 
license D.L. E0002253 and Ricky could not of been a truck 
driver because his license had been revoked for a long time 
for D.U.I, further Ricky couldn't have been in the process 
of starting his own trucking company because he was a trans-
ient, further Ricky did not arrive to this party at almost 
1:00 a.m., in the morning because by all witness's accounts 
he had been at this party drinking since 9:00 p.m., (Police 
Reports P. 10, See; Tr. of Trial P. 64, 69, 107, 183, 444) 
a witness named Mrs. Schuurman after trial by Assistant District 
Attorney Bernard Tanner and Mr. Wendell Coombs of the F.B.I. 
(EXHIBITS 3, 4, 5) that Ricky Myers in fact knew the victim 
previously and in fact was "fall" partners in crime with the 
victim and had been arrested with the victim in up to seven 
states including in Utah and that both had extensive criminal 
records and further Mr. Tanner stated that everyone from the 
District Attorney's Office to the Jail knew both Ricky and 
the victim, George Givens and also Ricky's testimony that he 
seen Mr. Medina shoot the victim where he Ricky then ran to 
the Greyhound Bus Depot and waited 4 or 5 minutes then called 
the Police is also false because the Appellant never shot 
the victim and because the walking distance to the Greyhound 
Bus Depot was approximately 29-minutes, and the homicide 
occurred at 4:20 a.m., but Ricky had not called the Police 
till 6:08 a.m., leaving a 1-hour and 20 minutes unaccounted 
for by Ricky (Tr. of TriaL P. 429, 18, 340). Which was even 
more pronounced and incriminating on Ricky's part because at 
the time of his arrest he stated to Police that he was only 
calling them (Police) because his truck was parked at the 
scene of the homicide and was registered in his name and he 
didn't feel like digging a deeper hole for himself and he 
also, had negative feelings about calling the Police and that 
he saw the Police arrive, who had arrived in less than a 
minute after the homicide, but didn't want to talk to them 
and ran away from the area on foot (Tr. of Trial P. 296-298 
339, 18). 
which was indicative of guilt on Ricky Myers part and alleged and 
used a defense by Trial Counsel, and should have been investigated 
as such by Counsel before proceeding to Trial. 
(C) The only other person to implicate the Petitioner was a wit-
ness by the name of Eli Archuletta whose testimony came about after 
the defense rested (Tr. of Trial P. 496) when Counsel was made aware 
of the Prosecutors intention of calling Eli as a witness, Appellant 
claims that the handling of the evidence and known facts concerning 
this witness Eli, that Counsel's performance was again prejudicial 
in not comprehending the importance of investigating a witness's 
testimony in a murder trial when all facts known to Counsel show 
that this witness's testimony was inaccurate, self serving, moti-
vated and uncorroborrated, and warranted inquirey for the foregoing 
facts and circumstances alleged to be the basis of Appellants claims 
at this stage: 
(1) When Counsel was made aware of Eli's testimony and that 
a confession and incriminating testimony by the Appellant, 
Counsel stated that "she had not been aware of Eli or his 
testimony and was put in a bad posture, and therefore; 
requested she be given an opportunity to talk to Eli 
about his testimony and to talk to Appellant and have an 
opportunity to call a witness in rebuttal to Eli Archuletta 
or she (Counsel) would be an ineffective assistant, 
(Tr. of Trial P. 497) where the Judge agreed and stated 
that he thought it would only be appropriate "In the light 
of the fact Eli has recently appeared" and therefore; 
recessed, and put no time limit in affording Counsel this 
opportunity and stated "we will recess and I'll just check 
with you later about when we will reconvene" (Tr. of Trial 
P. 498) 
(2) .After recess Counsel talked to Eli (10-min.) and told by 
Eli that Appellant had met him (Eli) in the Annex Bar 
several months before the homicide resulting (3) in Eli 
later saleing Appellant a .38 revolver, in which 1-month 
after the homicide Mr. Medina was alleged to of met Eli 
again in the Annex Bar and essentially confessed saying, 
"I didn't use any gun you sold me I used a .32" and that 
he (Appellant) shot the victim because "they were arguing" 
in which the alleged incidents from the initial meeting 
to the confession had occured within the past year, prior 
to trial (Tr. of Trial P.508). 
(3) After spending approximately 10-
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Wherefore Appellant alleges Counsel's performance was pre-
judicially deficient in allowing Eli's unfounded and inaccurate 
testimony by Trial Counsel's own admission in that Trial Counsel 
requested a recess to find a witness in rebuttal to Eli or she woul 
be an "Ineffective Assistant", and Counsel did not call the Annex 
Bar to check Eli's story for rebuttal witness's and if Counsel had 
tried she would of called the Annex Bar (as Appellant did) and 
found out by the owner Joe Giron and Bartenders that Eli was lieing 
and would have testified so (EXHIBIT 9) but instead Counsel simply 
talked to Eli and Appellant for 25-minutes (Tr. of Trial P. 500) 
and rushed back to Trial, which really galls AppelLants sense of 
fairness in light of witness Eli,now openly brags about having lied 
and gotten Appellant convicted of the very easons alleged by App^l 
(See Exhibit 12) here at the Utah State Prison. 
Appellant asserts another alleged instance of prejudice was 
the Prosecutors use of/and Counsel's failure to object, record, and 
preserve for Appeal, prejudicial closing arguments dealing in matte 
not in fact or record that were racially inflamatory and insinuated 
previous murder crimes and also in which the Jury was not admon-
ished or requested to be so by Counsel, which called to the atten-
tion of the Jury remarks they were not justified in considering, 
for instance when the Prosecutor stated: (EXHIBIT 6) 
[4] At the time of Trial Eli was testfying pursuant to an agree-
ment with District Attorney Ted Cannon and Deputy District 
Attorney Michael Christensen that he would not be prosecuted 
for dealing in stolen firearms and property and Felony 
Burglaries and all pending charges would be dropped thus Eli 
would not be sent back to prison for violating his parole in 
which at this time Eli had further served time at the Colorado 
State Prison and had an extensive criminal record since he 
was a juvenile and presently back in prison for numerous 
other Felony Burglary and thefts. 
"What more do you need a confession from Mr. Medina just 
the fact the bullet found in his car matched the bullet 
that killed the victim proves he's the murderer, further 
Eli Archuletta is Mr. Medina's friend and he testified 
Medina had confessed to him and that he had sold Medina 
a .38 revolver, just look at him he ain't nothing but a 
macho-mexican who was being macho the night he became 
irate with the victim and shot him, don't kid yourself 
you have to live with the consequences of your verdict 
and all you have to do to put an end to all the needless 
bloodletting, murdering and killing going on is simply 
Just convict Mr. Medina, and Mr. Medina shot the victim 
at point blank range because he was a bad shot with a 
firearm when he then jumped the wall enclosing the victim 
and ran to his car. (5) 
Appellant submit this was plain error need admonishment because 
Because no where in the record does it prove the bullet 
was found in the Appellants car or that the Appellant was 
a macho Mexican or become irate with the victim or Eli 
Archuletta's friend or that Appellant had ever been in-
volved in any murders. Further Appellant was awarded th6 
highest meritorious commendation 'n marksmanship hitting 
targets at 500-ft. being an expert sharpshooter (EXHIBIT 
7) and could not of (and not proved) jumped the 4-ft. 
enclosing the victim because Appellant has a lame left 
leg and can't jump which he injured in the army and can 
be proven by Army and hospital records, further at no 
time was there ever any blood or gunshot residue found on 
Appellant when extensive tests were conducted at the 
State Lab. 
[5] The State has stressed by insinuation that upon leaving 
the party that Appellants cousin admitted he stepped 
over the victim's body upon his arrest, Leonard Fernandez 
stated there was bodies lying all over the place and upon 
leaving the victim and Ricky Myers were still in the kit-
chen (Tr. of Trial P. 122, 124, 144, 146). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellants Court appointed Trial Counsel by failing to conduct 
adequate investigation and discovery resulted in Counsel undermining 
the proper function of the adversarial process resulting in appal-
ling prejudice by the use of perjured testimony and false evidence 
to convict Appellant that decisely affected the outcome of trial 
which the challenged actions of Counsel cannot be considered sound 
trial strategy because Counsel had a duty to conduct these investi-
gations at a minimum to ascertain strategy, but were inexcusable 
ignorance and senseless disregard of Appellants Rights resulting in 
a Manifest Injustice. 
Appellant submi\s by the same logic the Prosecutor knowingly 
used perjured testimony and false evidence and prejuc":ial closing 
arguments and direct actions that deprived Appellant of his rights 
of due process and a fair trial, resulting in Collusion and Contam-
ination and Fabrication of the facts that arose to a constitutional 
level of deprivation of Appellants above stated Constitutional 
Rights, Pursuant to the Provisions of the 6th and 14th Amendments. 
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
Appellants Court appointed Trial Counsel comitted reversible 
error by failing to conduct adequate investigation and discovery 
both Factual and Legal into Appellants plausible line of defense 
that worked to an actual and substantial disadvantage depriving 
Appellant of due process and a fair trial and effective assistance 
of counsel at each of the critical stages of the proceedings against 
Appellant, in that Counsel failed to conduct adequate investigation 
into the foregoing herein after represented as A,B,C, . . . . 
(A) Counsel failed to conduct independent investigation to know 
and ascertain if the governments charge were true if in fact, 
the bullet that the victim allegedly died from was found in 
the Appellants car as the Appellant was charged. 
(B) Counsel failed to adequately investigate the sole adverse 
witness. 
(C) Counsel failed to investigate and suppress the false testi-
mony of a convict with a vendetta. 
(D) Counsel was further ineffective by not objecting, recordin 
or preserving for Appeal prejudicial and racially biased 
closing arguments that were inflamatory and falsely in-
sinuated previous heinous murder crimes. 
(E) Appellate Counsel was ineffective at critical stages. 
The Right of an accused to Counsel is assured by Section 12, 
Article 1 of the Utah Constitution and by the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution, which in State vs. 
Lairby 699 P. 2d 1187, 1203-06 (Utah 1984) the Utah Supreme Court 
adopted the standards for assessing an ineffective assistance of 
Counsel claim by articulation of the United States Supreme Court 
decision in Strickland vs. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1983). See; 
also; State vs. Frame 723 P. 2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986) in which the 
court in Strickland held that this Sixth Amendment Right is to ef-
fective assistance of counsel, and the benchmark for judging any 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim must be whether Counsel's 
(1) conduct and representation so undermined the proper function 
of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as 
having produced a just result, Strickland, Supra at 682, thus this 
"very premise" that underlies and gives meaning to the Sixth Amend-
ment is meant to assure fairness in adversary criminal process, 
United States vs. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364, 66 L.Ed. 2d 564, 
101, S Ct 665 (1981). Thus the right to effective assistance of 
Counsel is the right of the accused to require that the prosecutions 
case to survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing by 
being subjected to meaningful effective cross examination as a re-
sult of Trial Counsel conducting investigations to secure evidence, 
(13) 
witness T s , testimony and exhibits to test the Prosecutions case or 
the process loses its character as a confrontation between adver-
saries rendering counsel ineffective as an advocate, which infects 
the trial by the lack of adversarial testing and effective cross 
examination, thus violating this constitutional guarantee. (Cuyler -
vs. Sullivan 446 U.S. at 343, 64 0. Ed 2d 333, 100 S. Ct 1708, 
Anders vs. California 386 U.S. 738, 743, 18 L.Ed 2d 493, 87 S. Ct 
1396 (1967). 
Thus Courts in the past have focused on Counsels overal perfor-
mance, but the type of breakdown in the adversarial process that im-
plicates the Sixth Amendments is not limited to Counsel's perfor-
mance as a whole, specific errors and mmmis-ions may be the focus of 
a claim of Ineffective Assistance as well, .bee; Strickland at 693-696 
and has held that the Sixth Amendment imposes on Counsel a duty to 
investigate because reasonable effective assistance must be based on 
professional decisions and informed legal choices which can be made 
only after investigation of options and investigatory decisions and 
must be assessed in light of the information known to Counsel at the 
time, thus if there's only one plausible line of defense, Counsel 
must conduct a "Reasonably Substantial Investigation: into that line 
before proceeding to trial, "Since there can be no strategic choice 
that renders such an investigation unnecessary". Strickland, Supra 
at 689, (Quoting Rummel vs. Estelle, 590, F.2d 103, 104, (CA-5 1979). 
Thus with regard to the two-part standard set forth by the 
High Court in Strickland, Appellant asserts that the High Court and 
Circuit have been called upon to address the issue of Counsel's 
failure to conduct reasonable pre-trial investigation and discovery 
[1] The two prong standard mandated by Strickland requires Appellant 
to show (1) that Counsel rendered a demonstrable deficient per-
formance and (2^ that trial Counsels error was nrpiudirial and 
and have continually found it ineffective which the Appellant herein 
submits for this Courts consideration the Three (3) case's that have 
had the most exhaustive review and are directly analogous to Appel-
lants claims submitted herein, whcih Appellant first directs this 
Courts attention to the High Courts decision in Kimmelman vs. -
Morrison 106 S. Ct 2574 (1986) (Id. at 2588) which held: 
(A) That Trial Counsel rendered Ineffective Assistance in his failure 
to conduct Pre-Trial discovery and investigations that would have 
disclosed the illegal search and seizure of incriminating evi-
dence used against the Appellant, which the High Court found 
this to be a dereliction of duty to make reasonable investi-
gation and ineffective for failing to make a reasonable decision 
that made particular investigations unnecessary Iji. at 2589, 
(Quoting Strickland Supra at 668) which Appellant asserts should 
be assessed in light of Appellants claim in the first instance 
(A) Involving the only evidence used against the Appellant 
being a .38 bullet and pursuant to Criminal Law 641.13 (6) 
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 6. (Supra Page (1) 
(B) Appellant in the second instance directs thio Courts attention-
to the Fifth Circuit's Courts decision in Nealy vs. Cabanna 764 F.2d 
1173 (1985) (Id. at 1173) which held that: 
(1) Petitioners Counsel's failure to contact p 
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[2] Martin vs. Maggio 711 F.2d 1273, 1280 (5th Cir. 1980) quoting 
Washington vs. Strickland 693 F. 2d 1243, 1251 (5th Cir. 1982) 
See; Kennedy vs. Maggio 725 F. 2d 269, 272 (5th Cir. 1984) 
Baldwin vs. Maggio 704 F. 2d 1325, 1333 (5th Cir. 1983) "Counsel 
has a duty at a minimum to interview potential witness's and 
of the facts, "Bell vs. Watkins 692 independant investigation 
999, 1009 (5tb Cir. 1982) Rummel vs 
(5th Cir. 1979) 
Bar Association 
1980) 
1982) 
Estelle 590 F.2d 103,104, 
This duty is also reflected in the American 
standard for Criminal Justice 4-4.11 (2d ed.-
See: Knot vs. Maybry 6/1 F.2d 1208, 1212-13 (8th Cir.-
Williams vs. Martin 618 F.2d 1021, 1027, (4th Cir. 1980) 
M ^ 
(C) And in the third instance Appellant request's this Court to 
view Davis vs. Alabama 596 F.2d 1214, 1221 (5th Cir. 1979) for its 
opinions regarding the amount of investigation into expert testi-
mony and evidence required of a Defense Counsel and to ascertain if 
Counsel's performance was reasonable in discerning the plausible 
line of defense employed by Counsel regarding investigating persons 
to implicate the Appellant before proceeding to Trial also being 
mostly a convict parolee with a know vendetta or if Counsel's choice 
of defense v/as ineffective for excluding other critical lines of 
defense for no apparent investigative or strategic reason, especi-
ally in light of what was known to Counsel at the time and circum-
stances which Appellant submits for consideration that the Court in 
Davis found that: 
When Trial Counsel failed to investigate and develop possible 
sources of evidence regarding the Defense Counsel chose to 
employ at Trial, and being the only line of defense, Counsel 
ascertained as^plausible, Counsels performance was deficient 
and ineffective because Counsel did not discharge the duty 
owed to the client and remanded the case to determine whether 
Counsel v/ould have uncovered helpful evidence had Counsel 
properly investigated Id, at 1221; which Appellant respect-
fully asks this Court in their determination to view this in 
accordance to Criminal Law 641,13 (1) U.S.C.A. Const, Amend. 
6. Supra, Page (1) 
Therefore with redress to the two-part standard set forth by the 
Court in Strickland Appellant has easily met the first step because 
it is evident Trial Counsel rendered a deficient performance because 
all three (3) case's submitted for this Court's consideration (Supra) 
where investigative axioms have had exhaustive review the Courts 
have presumed that due to the facts and circumstance's surrounding 
a particular case that Counsel's decision usually not to investigate 
was a clearly developed strategy which reasonable judgement supported 
Counsels limitation on investigation, or that most Defendant's could 
not point to any speciffic evidence or witness's that could have 
been uncovered by a more through investigation, but here Appellant 
is arguing by pointing to decisively missing evidence and witness's 
that Counsel's decision to limit investigation into the facts known 
to Counsel before Trial was not supported by reasonable judgement 
or strategy because the missing testimony was needed for strategy 
to guide the Jury's correct appraisal and evaluation of the State's 
witness's conflicting testimony and the correctness of the evidence 
wrongly used against the Appellant, and reasonable judgement in 
supporting decisions and Appellants testimony in the presentation of 
Appellants defense. 
Notwithstanding investigations and simple competence a member 
of the Bar should show a willingness to identify himself with the 
interests of the Defendant and present such defenses as are avail-
able to him under the law and consistant with the ethic's of the 
profession ,Id_. upon review of the witness's affadavits in this matter 
it becomes apparent Appellants Trial Counsel did neither and was 
negligent in her handling of the evidence regarding potential wit-
nesses by facts known before trial for instance, concerning the z 
testimony and circumstance's surrounding Detective John Johnson who 
testified he found a bullet in the Appellants car upon a consent 
search, in which Counsel was provided a copy of the Police Reports 
No. 84025540 before Trial and Appellants immediate initial consul-
tation (25-days after the homicide) when released from Jail, which 
Appellant stated: 
That Appellant had told Counsel that he (Appellant) had not 
fired any gun or shot anyone and that he Appellant had left 
the party between 3:30-4:00 a.m., being almost 30-minutes 
before the homicide and at the time of his arrest he was 
drunk and could not remember giving permission or watching 
officers allegedly search his car and Appellant further did 
not have any idea how a .38 bullet could of been allegedly 
found in his car or for that fact how the police got in his 
car because the keys to his car were in his pocket and his 
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1. 
Thus in the face of such equivocal and inaccurate evidence an ef-
fective advocate in a murder case would have understood the impor-
tance of investigating these facts to produce evidence to challenge 
the accuracy of the evidence being adduced by the State and to as-
certain a plausible line of defense and to make strategic choice's, 
but in the instant case Defense Counsel not only made no attempt to 
contradict or explain this evidence but then Counsel stipulated to 
its use and admission which was deficient because if Counsel had 
[3] See; United States vs. Gambino 788 F.2d 738, 949 (3rd Cir. -
1986) Ineffective Assistance CTaims not entertainable on Direct 
Anpeal with the narrow exception of a clear conflict of interest 
on record or where claim concerns an Ineffectiveness iegarding 
an objection, See; United States vs. Stitzer 785 F.2d 1506, 1520 
(11th Cir. 1986) Claims of Ineffective Assistance may not gen-
erally be considered for the first time on Direct Appeal. See; 
made investigation Counsel would have found the car belonged to the 
neighbors which was more compounded by the prosecution stressing 
from opening arguments all the way through Trial and Closing Argu-
ments (EXHIBIT 8) that the bullet was found in the Appellants car 
and proved he was the murderer, and Appellant could not raise these 
issue's on Direct Appeal because: 
Appellants investigative issues and closing arguments were not cog-
nizable on Direct Appeal because they concern matters off the re-
cord and all cognizable issues were raised on Direct Appeal which 
the Supreme Court stated in (State vs. Wulffenstein 657, P.2d 289, 
292, (Utah 1982) They will not consider matters off the record, 
thus Appellants immediate claims are no cognizable on Direct Appeal. 
(3). 
Appellant asserts that Counsels performance was not only deficient 
for stipulating to t * s evidence but was also prejudicial requiring 
reversal as well because its been well settled and established that 
you cannot use mistaken identification of evidence resulting in the 
Jury being mislead as to its reliability, because the Jury's only 
duty is to assess the reliability of the evidence, and if the Jury 
is given mistaken identification of evidence to consider the high 
court and circuits have held its a direct violation of due process 
and a fair trial, the Rules of Evidence (402) and cognizable as just 
plain error•(4). 
The Appellant readily admits that the adequacy of an attorney's 
service on behalf of anaccused must be gauged by the totality of his 
representation, not be fragmentary segments analyzed in isolated 
[4] See; ^ L^qxal1 .^s^ Denno 388 U.S. 293 (1976) Neil vs. Biggers, 
409 U.S. -188 (1972) Hanson^s. BrathwaiJ^e 432 U.S. 98 (1977) 
Faster_vs^-XBlifornia 394 U.S. 440, 442 N.2 (1969) Watkins vs. 
^£l>wdpns_ 449 U.S. 341 (1981) United,, States vs. Shultz 689 F.2d 
365, 368 (8th Cir. 1983) See; Fed^R. Crim. Pro. Rule 12 F 
that grants relief despite waiver if Defendant can give color-
ful showing he was unaware that evidence used was irreparable 
mistaken identification. See; also Rule 52 (B) Court may notice 
a plain error at any stage of a criminal proceeding despite a 
timely objection and See; also Rules of Evidence 402 that pro-
hibit the use of evidence that is misleading, unfair & prejudicial 
cells (State vs. McNichol 554 P.2d 203 (Utah 1976) but whicle at firs 
blush it may apppear that the Appellant is attempting to isolate one 
particular part of his Counsels representation, a closer examination 
reveals that Counsels failure to further adequately investigate the 
State's alleged sole eyewitness and the only other person to implicat 
the Appellant effectively destroyed all of the Appellants Rights co a 
Fair Trial and Effective Representation throughout zhe entire course 
of his Trial, which at this point it is critical to recall wha: was 
known to Counsel before Trial with respect to these cwo witnesses 
when considering if Counsels conduct was reasonable or strategic or 
just plain derelict, which Appellant looks to what the Court stated 
in State vs. Wood 648 P.2d 71, 91 (Utah 1982) which the Court noted 
that to avoid forcing a Defendant to resorting to self representation 
an attorney should present a defense when isisted upon by a defendant 
even though it may be against the better judgement of the attorney 
Id. Whereas Appellant was also denied a de ^ nse when isisted upon by 
telling Counsel of the inaccuracy of the State's witness's which re-
quired objection or, immediately required investigation without Appel 
lants insistance in the first place, because of the inaccuracy of the 
facts and evidence in the case, which by pointing out what was known 
to Counsel before trial about boch adverse witness's a clear denial o 
a defense can be established. 
(B) Counsel before trial knew from the police reports that the victim 
and alleged eyewitness Ricky Myers were from the same area of 
California being the "Bay Area" of Oakland and San Francisco 
which Ricky Myers claimed he didn't knew the victim or ever been 
arrested, but upon his arrest had made incriminating statements, 
Counsel I knew also that no efforts were made to retrace Ricky's 
steps for a weapon or to run an F.B.I. Rap Sheet for an out of 
State Record or breathalyzer test when Ricky was drunk, or any-
thing but on Counsel's copy of the Police Reports it was stated 
by a witness named Willie Valdez that he seen a person who was 
possibly Ricky fighting with the neighbor the day before and 
Counsel was further told by Appellant of numerous witness's who 
had seen Ricky and the victim drinking and waving around firearms 
a week before the homicide also next door, Ricky claimed he just 
arrived in town 3-days before. Also at the Preliminary Hearing 
Counsel knew Ricky tried to deny he seen the Appellant shoot the 
victim 18-times then simply state "I'll say it was Jerry who 
shot the victim because you (Counsel) pressured me to" which 
Counsel at this point knew Ricky Myers way lying enough to choose 
it as a defense and say it to the Jury in Opening and closing ar-
gument^ (Addendum). 
Thus Appellant asserts that Counsel was ineffective for not in-
vestigating and developing possible sources of evidence like the 
F.B.I, for Ricky's out of State Rap Sheet because it would of showed 
Ricky and the victim were crime partners and further was needed for 
the defense employed at trial because if Counsel; had Counsel would 
have perjured and impeached this alleged sole witness and the State's 
case could not have been established had this alleged sole witness's 
credibility been discredited, which Counsel's conduct was further 
drelict because Counsel did not discharge the duty owed to the Appel-
lant Pursuant to U.S.C.A. Criminal Law 641.13 (1-6) and by conducting 
Pre-Trial Discovery and ineffective for notmaking a reasonable de-
cision that made certain investigations unnecessary because Counsel 
also before trial knew Rickyk was lieing because he had lied at Pre-
liminary about his alleged place of employment, but nonetheless the 
the only other investigation conducted by Counsel before trial was 
into the weather and a walk to a bus depot being unnecessary because 
witness's were called to testify and point out to the Jury matters 
already testified to and which were in the Police Reports being it 
was raining and snowing the night of the homicide and cnat Ricky 
walked to the Greyhound Bus Depot and called Police. 
Counsel's deficient conduct was again demonstrated with the only 
other person to implicate the Appellant named Eli Archuletta, which 
Counsel's conduct considering the circumstance's was indicative of 
serious misconduct on Counsel's part in regard to her duties concerning 
the facts which were: 
(C) That after Counsel had rested Appellants defense Counsel was 
informed of the Prosecutions intention to call a "Surprise wit-
ness" who was a parolee from the Utah State Prison who had been 
arrested for numerous felony burglaries and possession and selling 
stolen property and guns in which this witness Eli had agreed 
and made a deal to testify against Appellant if the State dropped 
all pending charges and did not violate his parole and send him 
to prison, which at the time that Counsel was informed that Eli 
was going to testify Counsel requested that she be allowed time 
to question Eli about what his testimony was going to, discuss 
the matter with Appellant and try to find witness's in rebuttal 
to afford Appellant "Effective Assistance" and "Effective Repre-
sentation" (Tr. of Trial P.497) which the Honorable Judge J. -
Dennis Fredrick agreed and gave Counsel all the time she needed 
to do so by stating "it would only be appropriate to take a recess 
for this opportunity to hear Eli's testimony and try to contact 
rebuttal witness's and I'll just contact you later about when 
we'll reconvene" at which point Counsel talked to Eli and was 
told by Eli what his testimony was going to be, talked to the 
Appellant and was informed of a serious conflict and that Eli 
was lieing and never sold Appellant anything (which Counsel never 
mentioned anything that the alleged transaction occured in the 
Annex Bar) and that Eli's testimony was fabricated and self-
(11 \ 
serving because of this "deal" and "conflictfT and was only ob-
vious because it was uncorroborrated by no evidence or wit-
ness's and that Counsel hould object, but Counsel should of 
also objected because it was also apparent Eli lacked factual 
knowledge, because Eli stated Appelant essentially confessed 
saying he killed the victim because they were "arguing" when 
the fact was at this time by all witness's accounts Appellant 
never argued or fought with the victim, which at this point 
Counsel had spent approximately 15-minutes talking to Eli and 
10-minutes talking to the Appellant and instead of trying to 
verify Eli's testimony and find rebuttal witness's as was the 
purpose of the recess. Counsel chose to just go back to Trial 
25-minutes after the recess (Tr. of Trial P.500) leaving the 
Appellant hollering to his brother to run down and try to find 
ou: if Richard Martinez (the rebuttal witness) was home to try 
and shed some light on the motive behind Eli's testimony and 
to hurry, which Counsel never even planned to call this witness 
and another recess was called for discussion with this witness 
(Tr. of Trial P.519). 
Thus Appellant asserts that under .these^Circumstanees that 
Counsel was derlict because Eli had told Counsel what his testimony 
was going to be which was that he Eli had met Appellant in the 
Annex Bar a few months before the homicide to discuss a transaction 
about buying a gun around December 1983 and Appellant had confessed 
to him Eli a month after the homicide around May of 1984, the Judge 
gave Counsel all the time she wanted by recess to converse with 
witness's and find rebuttal witness's by conducting investigation, 
to afford effective representation and assistance and Counsel chose 
to do neither, because if nothing else Counsel had a duty to at lea 
call the Annex Bar and see if the Appellant had been there in the 
last year and when and or to try and call Appellants cousin back 
to the stand to testify, when given this recess, to the serious-
ness of the conflict because if Counsel had Counsel would of learne 
from the owner and part time bartender and disc-jockey that the 
Appellant had not been in the 3ar from at least December 1983 to 
SEptember 1984 and had never been seen around Eli anywhere much 
less the Annex Bar (Addendum) but Counsel instead simply chose to 
falsely implicate Appellant with Eli by giving inaccurate credi-
bility to this witness and corroborrate the Prosecutions claim 
that Eli was dealing in stolen guns and sold Appellant a gun and 
was testifying so he would not be charged as an accessory which was 
totally unfounded in the first place (Tr. of Trial P.512) Counsel 
should have just objected to this witness as suggested on the groun 
he lacked personal knowledge, evidence, and his testimony was false 
motivated and wrongly self serving and inaccurate and Eli was an 
uncredible witness. 
Appellant further asserts for this Courts consideration that 
notwithstanding Counsel's deficient performance and the irreparable 
prejudice already established by the Appellant, that it is error to 
assume that prejudice has to be shown in all the circumstances, 
Appellant re-asserts that he is also alleging that Counsel's 
failure to conduct reasonable investigation also denied him his 
right of Effective Cross Examination at Trial, which the High Court 
in Davis vs. Alaska 415 U.S. 308, 39 L.Ed 2d 347, 94 S. Ct 1105 
(1974) Held that prejudice need not be demonstrated under these 
circumstances and would be assumed under these circumstances and 
stated: 
When a Petitioner has been denied his Right to Effective Cross 
Examination, it is Constitutional error of the First Magnitude 
that no amount of showing of want of prejudice would cure be-
cause the likelihood that even a fully competent lawyer could 
provide adequate assistance^ is so unlikely that prejudice is 
presumed without inquirey into the actual conduct at Trial 
(Citing Smith vs. Illinois 390 U.S. 129, 131, 19 L.Ed 2d 956, 
88 L.Ed 2d 657, 104 S.Ct (1986) Powell vs. Alabama 287 U.S. 
45, 77 L.Ed 2d 158 S.Ct 55, 84 ALR 527 (1932) 
Further that circumstances of this magnitude are so likely to pre-
judice that the cost of litigating the effect is not justified. [5] 
(D) Appellant asserts in response to another alleged instance of 
Counsels ineffectiveness in not objecting, recording, or preserving -
appeal prejudicial closing arguments that had no basis in record 
cr evidence that insinuated previous heinous murder crimes and racial 
bias which CounseJ failed to also ask for Jury instructions ad-
monishing the Jury the State cites State vs. Smith 700 P.2d 1106 
(Utah 1985) for the proposition that the remarks eri comments were 
at mobt harmless error, but the Court in Smith stated: 
MThe test is did the remarks call to the attention of the 
Jury matters which they-would not be justified in considering 
in determining their verdict and were they under the circumstances 
of the particular case probably influenced by the remarks" 
State vs. Valdez P.2d 422, 426, (1973) Id. at 1112. 
[5] See e.g. Flanagan vs. United States 465, U.S. 259, 267, 79 
L.Ed 2d 288, 104 S.Ct 1051 (1984) fig^n* ^ - WiiiiamQ 425 
U.S. 501, 504 48 L.Ed 2d 126, 96 S.Ct 1691 (1976) Murphy vs. 
Florida 421 U.S. 794, 44, L.Ed 2d 5S9, 95 S.Ct 2031 (1975) 
Bruton vs. United States 391 U.S. 123, 136, 137, 20 S.Ed 2d 
476, 88 S.Ct 1620 (1968) Sheppard vs. Maxwell 384 U.S. 333, 
nr- <=» v Q . Hiirrn i nson 
351 16 L.Fd 2d 600,86 S.ct 1507 (1964) Payne vs. Arkansas 
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it goes without saying bringing remarks that had no basis in Evi-
dence or record called to the Jury's attention matters that were 
unjustified in considering and that they were influenced by these 
remarks, because the factual difference is in Smith the Court found 
substantial evidence of Appellants guilt and no prejudice because 
the Jury was instructed not to consider the statements as evidence, 
but unlike Smith the Court in the instant case, the Jury was not 
admonished not to consider the remarks as evidence and the Prose-
cution did not present substntial evidence indicative of guilt but 
used inaccurate and falsely established testimony and evidence to 
convict Appellant thus prejudice to Appellant is more easily esta-
blished . 
(E) Appellant alleges Counsel on Direct Appeal was ineffective for 
not catching and bringing to the attention of the Utah Supreme Court 
on Appeal or Supplementation of Record Trial Counsels error's not-
withstanding that they were unappealable and satisfy the cause and 
prejudice standard Pursuant to Wainwright vs. Sykes 443 U.S. 7 2, 
87 (1977) But mostly ineffective for failing to file a Petition for 
Reconsideration v/hich Appellant made an attempt to within 30-days 
of decision to affirm his conviction but asserts this prejudicial 
error could hamper Appellants desire to show that Trial Counsels 
error's raised on Direct Appeal had nothing to do with strategy 
and tactic's or even logic, in which the High Court in Evitts vs. 
Lucy 105 S.Ct 837 (1985) Guaranteed Effective Assistance of Counsel 
on Direct Appeal where it is an Appeal as of a Right. 
Appellant submits for this Courts consideration that Trial 
Counsel Francis Palacios or Attorney for Respondents never testi-
fied at Appellants Evidentry Hearing that Counsels failures to 
investigate would of been fruitless or unreasonable, nor did they 
show or argue any speciffic strategy or tactic because Trial Counsel 
"did not choose" strategic or otherwise but simply abdicated her 
responsibility that resulted in a decisive and determinitive "factual 
vaccuum" in Appellants conviction, of such prejudicial gravity that 
Appellants Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus should be granted 
to insure Appellant recieves a Fair Trial unless the State can 
prove Trial Counsel's error's were harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt Pursuant to Habeas Corpus Criminal Law 85.2 (2) 28 U.S.C.A. 
2254 with respect to Appellant demonstrating prejudice that worked 
to an actual and substantial disadvantage. 
POINT TWO 
Appellant alleges Prosecutorial Misconduct that denied him of 
Due Process and a Fair Trial because the Prosecutor should have 
or could have known of the Fabrication of all witness's testimony 
and Evidence at the time of Trial and further that the prejudicial 
closing arguments had no basis in record or fact and were to simply 
mislead and inflame the Jury, which at Trial the Prosecutor could 
have or should have known that (1) that the bulet used at the time 
of trial against the Appellant was not Appellants or found in his 
car as he Appellant had insisted and all Police Reports showed by 
all Officers accounts who positively identified the car (2) that 
he (Prosecutor) should have know that the alleged sole adverse 
witness Ricky Myers was lieing because he (Prosecutor) stated he 
had extensive criminal checks run on Ricky Myers (Tr. of Trial P.347) 
And Assistant District Attorney stated everyone from the District 
Attorneys Office to the Jail knew Ricky and the victime had been 
crime partners for years and (3) he should have also known Eli 
was lieing because Elifs testimony was uncorroborrated and lacked 
factual knowledge and was self-serving, inaccurate and criminally 
motivated and (4) he (Prosecutor) further should have known that 
his Closing Arguments were Plain Error. Because his Closing Argu-
ments had no basis in fact or evidence and were prely to mis-lead 
and inflame the Jury wrongly by insinuating previous murders, and 
using racial remarks for instance when he stated: 
What more do you need a confession from Mr. Medina just 
the fact the bulelt found in his car matched the bullet that 
killed the victim proves hefs the murder, further Eli Archuletta 
is Mr. Medina's friend and he testified Medina confessed to 
him and he sold Mr. Medina a .38 revolver, just look at him 
he ainft nothing but a Macho-Mexican who was being Macho the 
night he became irate with the victim and shot him, don't 
kid yourselves, you have to live with the consequences of 
your verdict, so all you have to do to stop all the needless 
bloodletting, murdering and killing going on is to simply 
just convict Mr. Medina. 
Appellant submits the Jury should have been admonished because: 
No where in the record does it prove the bullet was found in 
the Appellants car a 1972 Grey and Black Chevelle Malibu or 
that Eli Archuletta was ever Appellants fffriendfT or that 
Appellant was a "Macho-Mexican" or ever become "irate" or 
argue with the victim or that he was ever a suspect in any 
crime or murder previously as insinuated. 
Thus the Jury would of reach a different conclusion because without 
testimony and false evidence because without it there wouldn't of 
been any convicting evidence or testimony, and the Appellant submit 
a new trial is waranted because the Appellant was left unable to 
correct this falsity because he didnft learn of it until after 
trial because of the Prosecutor's intentional concealment, which 
possibly involved Trial Counsel, which is why Appellant alleges 
collusion, because trial counsel should have or could have known 
also, barring unexcusable prejudicial negligence in her ineffective 
representation. 
Appellant submits that the Court in United vs. Lord 711 F.2d 
887, 389 (9th Cir. 1983) found that the Prosecutor's deliberate 
intent to distort the fact finding process justified reversal when 
revealing post conviction discovery of evidence or perjury, in 
which Appellants claim of intentional misconduct involving this 
post conviction discovery of the known use or should of known use 
of perjured testimony or false evidence. Appellant is reminded of 
the fTl2radyff requirement of materiality set forth by th<~ Supreme Cou 
which has declared that "Implicit" is a concern it the suppressed 
evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial, for this the 
Appellant looks at the Court for its opinion in United States vs. 
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976) which stated the degree oC materiali 
required to overturn a conviction varied with the circumstances of 
the particular case, and distinguished three situations involving 
Postrial Revelation of Evidence favorable to the Defendant that 
the government knew or should of knew that the Defendant did not: 
(1) When a Prosecutor knew or should of knew the 
case contained perjured testimony the Court will 
reverse for non-disclosure, if the false testi-
mony could of affected the judgement of the Jury. 
(2) If the Defendant makes a 
"Brady" material, and the Cailure to disclose 
the material might of affected the outcome of 
trial. 
(3) When the Defendant did or did not fail to 
make a Brady request, the Court may reverse if 
the Nor-Disclosed evidence would o: created a 
reasonable doubt that might not of otherwise existed. 
(26) 
Agurs thus recognized that some evidence is so clearly ex-
pulatory that due process requires its disclosure, even when the 
defense fails to make a Brady request, and the Court went even 
further in Bagley vs, Lumpkin 719 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1983) where 
it noted that precedent set in the Circuit dictated that prosecu-
torial failure to respond to a specific Brady request is error 
and resulting conviction must be reversed inless the error is harm-
less beyond a reasonable doubt, JA. at 1463-64, but the court was 
apparently more concerned with Sixth Amendment problems in the 
case determining that the governments failure to provide the im-
peaching Brady material to Bagley, denied him the Right of Effective 
Cross Exmination of the Sole Adverse Witness, JA. at 1464, citing 
the holding of Davis vs. Alaska 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974) "That such 
denial was Constitutional Error of the first magnitude "Requiring 
Reversal, " the Court granted Bagley T s motion, Id. 1464. 
Appellant submit * lhat the Prosecutor in implying the existance 
of previous heinous murder crimes in closing arguments with racial 
implications and arguments that had no basis in record, prejudicing 
the Appellant, demonstrated a pattern of serious prosecutorial 
misconduct that was designed to obtain this wrongful conviction in 
which Appellant submits for the Prosecutor to avoid misconduct 
the Prosecutor should confine the opening and closing arguments to 
admissible evidence on record, and inferneces from that evidence, 
a Prosecutor should also avoid unfair or improper remarks about the 
Defendant, See; United States vs. Valdez-Guerra 758 F.2d 1411, 1416, 
(11th Cir. 1985) "Prosecutor should refrain from using arguments 
that have no basis in record and that are calculated to obtain a 
wrongful conviction, See; opinion of Chief Justice Burger in the 
case of Berger vs. United States 295 U.S. 78 88 (1975) "While a 
government attorney may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to 
strike foul ones" See; Donnelly vs. DeCristoforo 416 U.S. 637-647, 
648, (1974). Compare Phelps vs. Ducksworth 757, F.2d 811, 824 (7th 
Cir.1985) Affirming District Court decision granting Defendants Writ 
of Habeas Corpus when Prosecutor engaged in conduct which denied 
Defendant due process. See; United States vs. Smith 700 F.2d 627, 
633 (11th Cir. 1983) United States vs. Barton 731 F.2d 669, 675 
(10th Cir. 1987) "Court may notice plain error even if not objected 
to "Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 52 (B) See; United States vs. Monagan, 741 
F ?H lA^A 1AAO-A1 (T). P.. Cir. IQRA) Whpn assissine effect of Prose-
cutorfs remark on Jury, due respect must be accorded to the Juryfs 
commonsense, but Prosecutor may not urge Jurrors to convict Defen-
dant in order to protect community values, preserve civil order or 
deter future law breaking or for reason's irrelevant to own guilt 
or innocense, See; United States vs. Serlin 707 F.2d 953, 960 
(7th Cir. 1983) Court does not condone misrepresentation of evi-
dence. See; United States vs. McPhee 731 F. 2d 1150, 1152-53 (5th -
Cir. 1984) reversal required when Prosecutor urged Jury to find 
Defendant guilty for a "Bunch of other reasons" and implied exis-
tance of other serious offences. 
CONCLUSION WITH A STATEMENT OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT 
WHEREFORE: Appellant respectfully submits that he verily believes 
that he has a meritorious cause of action and that he entitled 
to be granted an unconditional release and discharge from the 
unlawful and unconstitutional confinement and restraint imposed 
upon him as a result of the conviction entered against him 
deprivation of his Constitutional Rights, or in the alternate 
remand for a new Trial. 
THEREFORE: Appellant respectfully prays that upon the failure of 
the Respondent's to adduce legal evidence to the contrary in 
rebuttal to the Appellants claims that this Court shall grant 
the Writ of Habeas Corpus and direct that said Writ of Habeas 
shall issue forthwith; 
consistant therewith causing the release and discharge of 
Appellant unconditionally from the unlawful and unconstitu-
tional confinement and restraint and imprisonment presently 
imposed upon the Appellant by the Respondent's at the Utah 
State Prison. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
JETHPTJOE MEDINA 
P.OA Box 251) 
Drape* , Utaft 84\p20 
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, (EXHIBIT - 2) 
(Copy of l e t t e r is a " a c n e o * cr reference . i - - so, sor.eau^in^ v. 4 ' p o L n t > , , 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 . * ~~' a^T^mtr.e-. *•* *~"* ~^nr.e" 
22 asked me w£y wasr1 . -ce **-.:;« . . u support *. *. _.n r -o a.. 
23 II ^r^so**, ~" 16k«^ m^ .—,' 3- -old him he was convicted for second ie™ee 
24 II murce i . 
25 i) 'mr.er as<ei me who *ve lecease . vaa, -. : t e l a :.~ r._; njui.e ^ s George j i r - . j 
2- 5 "-1 " * ^a rne r ~t* ^ack - -a*~ "-r a rnirutsi 
27 I a^ a asK j ~. «c^ . , .. , , i 
28 I) asked me _f tn - r^ ^as a wi tness tr.. I : : I : IIT* * a t t;;e ~*erstn -*K. - ^ : ~ite 
2y || "*) Iniei;jin .mot t h i s George Givens . 'Mr# Tanner r e p l i e d ; 
know of J e r r y 1 3 t r i a l ? He s a i d , "No, t h a t he knows Ricky Myers •and George "both 
ifid they han/sr out a t s l e e z y , d i r t y "bar's and have "been .ar res ted and in .and out 
I! i i i l HI in Mini nil In' 11.1;i, mi11II II n 1 / !r M ' h h a re uri minal h i s t o r y ' s here in Utah 
and s e v e r a l o the r 3 l a t e a . He asked, ""How • i i d Ricky ever s t and t o t e s t i f y 
under o a t h , and who was J e r r y ' s attorney?"" I s a l d, "F ranc i s P a l a c i o s a Legal, 
Deiendei . I \i » n.n.l< 1 Mil, mil sh :> it I ;:i is 1 lea I , 1: ,e sa i :! , ,!Tha b' " 3 1 :: • :: bad 
ihe must" )C been the p i t s , and t h a t t r i a l a f a r c e , why d i d n ' t she r e sea rch 
I 1 li ip rprorclH"*1 ric" • 5 everyone from the D i s t r i c t At torneys Office to the 
ount'Y J a i l Knows r.iOK> and George, I tol , : .. -^r^ were aio'i 
if th ings she d i d n ' t do and a l o t of t h i n g s she should nave ion - , -e s a i d , 
" ' u O i m i i j I « || I I I I iKU'L I - I "i"> " 
l1mr
»8t a y e a r l a t e r , af t e r we l o s t our Appeal 1* .. the Supraje Court and we 
decided t o f i l e a, Wri t of Habeas Corpus, I though * " ~ - ^ v e r s a t l o n with 
Bernard 1 anner anil 1 way ui LIIXIIII1: u ia i m 1 ,u 
from him r e g a r d i n g the informat ion he had # iven : u r i n g our appointment 
innn 1 , 11a, 1 « 1 I 1 I " 1 1 ' 1M"' M B 
l e t a r v . Re asked if he could re lay the na tu r e »* d j j ^ ^ . ^ n t ant . 
niji b r i e f If why T needed to see l ir . Panne" a r t i„] r a~*-e^ ' w was f i f t e e n 
minutes , M 'id Led
 f (o r my phone number ar. u » 
11II ' minutes a f t e r 1 hunr uof and s a i d ; "" 3r rememoerc 'wou and your 
sonversa t j on and, ca 1:1 see ;y 01 1, a t 2:15 P - nu today which was May 1 1, 196'/• J. ^Oxd 
him "Thank-You" and I mnff up, 
1 took J a n e t Schuurman with me so I would have someone v ; . I .J verif* 
inrro ruti1,1 nri I li 1 ,j t i me 1" li Ta n ner a :i nil t ted I le remembers ' "<= r 
.-'* whole c o n v e r s a t i o n we had a t the f i r s t appointment , he admit t e c - . * J 
•e-.i"c" our c o n v e r s a t i ? " *- *r: *d * —-sa^s zh* ^eoues~ :: i r =iffidav -
T-' ;veroayrnen* ' ; c ? , wnen he unisheci v .e c o n v e r s a t i o n v:i*r / r , ^r in/ jhain 
ae tumt- ; me anu sa id ne cuuxdn s i wixW <*n a i f i d a v i o fo r rae, u^u xi I 
tnrou/m ^ "'reedom of Information Act and I could get that a t the Salt Lake 
City libra:-* or I could even ro across the hall to the Supreme Coirt Law Library) 
Hi !:;!: 1 » ,1 s ? „ I a ske :l 1 :tj rii a »: a :i n t : t '1 ea se simi a n a ff i da v:i t and he 
said, *Ifi aorry." 3o .Janet and I wen t down the hall directly from Mr*. Tanner 1 
^fr:*-* wflilpd i few minutes because the Librarian, was "busy at the moment, 
* - r MI! in | I i i c H M i J •» I  -u j i i i i i " 'I hi n i t
 f 1 tc Il :1 1 i s i , ! ! 3S. I ne 3d the Free i i)ia ::::::>:;f 
rmati^r Act on Ricky Infers criminal record, she looked confused, so did I, 
.„« 3LG^-- — "What? I don't really "understand what it i s your asking for11 and 
irnai: i Tanner sent me here to get the Freedom of Inf ormati :i).n Ac t 
, -icicy V^ra criminal record, he sent me here to g e t that information. She 
**: '*a- «, :ri3ed for helnff rude but tha t he 
~ s-.«c. . +* * o.. r . . -*.- , ^ „ A L*;. :te because she was 'by herself 
+ *0^
 a^_ iac< —~~ -P - --©a- and she would help me« So I waited 
she asked t ::) speak t ::) Barnej 
4-a* it? -/as actually needing ^ut iuparentlv he was on another line so she 
^ -* * i e :: ame bac k t o i n 3 and s ai ci , 
i jiforaa^jL :i J: tne r ryedoro a: Information Act i s f ound then e and she 
^o.^^ed * - - aP * -r-.-»-: * - - • -*. . - ^ there and she'd try to get 
in i in i t e s I £ :)»\ u: i d s • :::»J ne th I rv? 
T'ling the :reec Inf crma-ion Act a. z walked back over to her .and asked 
her, ,fI'* * ;~ - laughed, and c-tment^I about being' surprised tha t 
1 w as a '3 J. or in houri or IU ILit! 1 ovn 
finally as-tinr for ;e t* - * : t? *nat was . but there was probably more 
i ipdated a nd hell i: lie a nd she d id, and 
by then * *~ ^retty Humiliated - « Tanner t:^t I told her 11 ne 4 1 lole reason 
I:was needing that information and the affidavit and Mr. Tanner refi ised to i 
wri te :::iiief I = • i =»n t :: "31 • bl ua t Mr # Tanner to] d : ie e: :ac tlj i ! l a lie:; t : • a s l :: i • ::>:r ar id 
I could tell, she didn't even ha re an idea of what I was talking about. 
Through our conversation she added comments, such as: n7igureof Sounds like 
«i VT' 
I - K C a+ -^e K r cv« n^P — ; l l ^ cf*" th.? -' e l f ar.J 
r o r t a i r : ~ - freedom :^ Inf o rma t : j~ *. * -*-'• 
: o n e : ar.vtr* ir.; 
.- , '.-a* ^e t t i n / r 
)ff • Be: ^re . . *f * 
,. ctroor.c: i^c **:a* vaj r . . anners *<** : ^rusnin^ 
" : ^ r a^ / * ^-w ~ i b r a r ' o r . vr~ 
., . : * . c n ' t f e e l bad, your - ~ae f i r s t one iarr.e- * i .err, ^ e r e ; 
3nouI " "me
 MA'W1 W*< - e ^ r l e ana le 
13 
14 
15 
16 
19 
20 
25 
2/1 
26 
28 
25 
mtc 
v a c a t i c r su j . or . 
woes ^al l inff and 1 ..oped she wor 
She rerae *d me and our T v o r ^ a ^ i c r ;*iat 
- l a v i t 
oheryl Saxtcn, 
~n an a f f i d a v i t 
-a:^ 
is<e * 'Tie 
i»i& una-; 
e r "d:^ ^ a t e r * -r 
a^ .rc ~ * , 
anv 
*:- a::'-* 
. »*r w r i t i n g su. a i -*aav i -
.er remeraoerin/? Tie <*rn * * 
:e a n . sn* 
. x i t e any t h i n 
r3*c-
a. , ^ d v . - jecaus° + -roi-.^ i i r e c t l y involve : e r / ' 
^ " " l a * " whatever sn*^  
^ r sona , . - kicked he r a f f i d a v i * ic en Aucust 
- f .^ 
j p ' 
:y oi o n e r ^ctv**.r*u - d ie rynce , 
oiihiscri hftij rinill i ii ii n in i id to re me t h i s 
NOTARY P-^ .T 
\- -(rl i 
• ) ] ^ 
8Worn.f " on oath depose arc say; , j »,.<_ 
-fci\iL bjjl^ bj Ti-oxkit^ ij-a: o, r ^ ; . 
- 7 -
. \ * i L'1 
wl^MIVui- V.-^-tXi'Oi I 
. . . , ! : - i . 
J\vd ~W ;J^" lha+"(-\i(i!':u- OLj-fs JXv(j hioton "i/u^  
GV ..>v» ;^ i'tcorc -''•Cv.i;.L '^vjiCOj .^ ; ivvj^ !Xvhtn ^ ^ 
•U- -\r- "i'l u r,\JaiuUA^ "-'fH'lL Hu-ih luiiiia A y > ^ y 
^ ,\[!ij:^ ;/•(-. IMI/JJ - - b | , "Furjci j- .•'.•'}'?;• 
V ^ ^ : A ^ J 'UOcatTiJai u|c :>L'r,'i " I ^'"vjoai -I'-yu^j^ciiilA u 
^ 111// "a,iw a t o i ^ y ^ "-i^ ^ n v . i « 
JiiliM 
1 to i-v i\(L L U ' ^ n o t a i - i 
r^ flxL, [1U^ 
Arf~~ i ; U $ 
ifeV ^ -. K RaB-i ^ i u a V '
0
^ ' ^
 4 K 
2^vfJa v 
> j 
•»••• ( I C t U + OoiC -• 1 JUKAU' 'lo ^ ^
 l
^
J a 
K o 0 L' 
Signed; 1 - - 'A •:•-'; 
^ ^ ! £ L d - .2 ij»y 
Janet C. Schuii! 
:m&m& 
Subscribed and sworn to belore me t h i s \ftaffitf ^ ^ ^ ^ L 9 ' 
EXHIBIT - s 
• — — • — — — • • i in • -
U.S. Department of Justice 
Federal Bureau, of Investigation 
In Reply, Please Refer to 
F i le No. 
Room 320 3 
Federal Office Building 
125 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
October 6, 1 98 7 
- .. - Medina 
3- 516 San Carlos DriTTe 
v o = ~ ' .'\"i *. :. *? v '*;'"*' "" * -
u e a - " ;. :"";-2 * i i > • 3.: 
This ... .... response tc yc-ir letter iated September 22
 f 
**
 nnmj
 7.-3 received at: the Salt Lake City Office on September 24f 
*
 f concerning the proceedures to obtain j n ^ r ^ h - n 
vA**v*er the Freedom of Information Act 
/.MI must, provide your zc. date and place c 
birth, prior addresses, emplLy.>. :s, and any other specific 
details tna: *'ou' - *: .>.-:• . *:-t -f "^T>?sr.?d * ^ cords. 
Additionally.- *: i/.sure tnat personal information 
is released only to an authorized individual, the requester 
must submit a notarized signature (or a notarized authorization 
giving the requester access to another individual's records). 
: irei: y I::i: i ill j } DI irs, 
Rober t M. Bryant 
^'tUnsT* £>'- /y.yit<~ 
By: V e r n o n D. K o h l 
Assistant Special Agent in Charge 
•LLUVL1 JL.D ± 1 — ( 
J# ^ #f/ ^ /< ^ / V ^ / , jf/fs'A/rt/v A - - the undersigned being 
first duly swornf on oath depose and say: 7HAT o/i/ J. / y SfJ\ /a 
VIM * , * . J m.r fixity ar (,/f- e*-Kes;ne. C,V aU 
*T A , ' s // ,r t< , ^ i V r / l £ ^,0^ ( (j ^ f ^ i , < i n a ) , V A ^n 
J : ° f 7 ' ^ ^ > - *«« A-i ft*//,,.,, 4«,W„ 
<s -h/me, ffe / i , y , T of hU Aonla/de. u>ha,\ t 
ix>*.f
 00f- Qj- ^ -f^caf- cioc>^/ and they a>e.f<L 
r*V*S, +Aov^k +Ae;ft ^^e 0+A^s + k a . i <*• I SO a. i 
Subscribed and sworn to 
Ny Commission expires: 
•ft** cAooP, t^-
day of 
1. 11 Jerry Joe Medina 
P.O. Box 250 
2 11 Draper, Utah 84020 
5 
4 I I IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
5 I I STATE OF UTAH 
6 
7 I I JERRY JOE MEDINA 
8 Petitioner, < CIVIL ACTION 
9 ) C A S E N0: C87-7241 . 
101 J GERALD L. COOK, WARDEN et al., \ SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF 
LEONARD FERNANDEZ 
111 I Respondent's, 
12 
13 I I STATE OF UTAH)' 
: SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT 
14 j I COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
I, /, p ^ , '„ -' ,• l . it, j, ''' . being first sworn upon my oath 
depose and say: 
That if I had known Eli Archuleta was going to testify against Jerry 
during his trial I also would have testified as to the vendetta and throats 
he constantly made with our family. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 I I I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and 
22 j j correct signed this )' day of , ,. '-; k, 1988. 
23 
24| 
25 
26 11 Signed:
 y ,- . • I • ' •'  ' ' '( ,',',{ a, 1 1, :'. 1 
/ 
1' 1 Leonard Fernandez 
2 7 I I < / 
29 
50' 
ripped open a second portal into the Wil-
berg Mine Friday and began pumping in v 
nitrogen foam in hopes of using the " e n -
trance to shorten the task of reopening the 
mine. The mine's portals were sealed shut 
with earth and cement-lilce materials to help 
smother the fire that killed 27 miners Dec. 
19. The portal, known as Third East, would 
to the bodies. Ultimately, the Emery Mining 
Corp., which operates the mine for Utah 
Power & Light Co., hopes to recover the 
bodies and mine the Wilberg's coal again. 
In February, crews entered the mine 
through the nearby Fourth East portal, but 
the attempt was abandoned when it was 
discovered the Third East tunnel was not 
route could save several weeks in reopen-
ing the mine. UP&L spokesman John Ward 
said workers will continue pumping nitro-
gen foam into the mine to cool the smolder-
ing coal and could possibly enter the tunnel 
Friday night. The crews will inch their way 
forward, shoring up the burned roof as they 
go, he said. 
EXHIBIT - 8 
edina guilty in slaying of Ohio man 
By Jan Thompson 
Ceseret News staff writer 
Jerry Joe Medina was found guilty of second-
degree homicide for the shooting death of a Cleve-
land man after a jury deliberated 10 hours Friday. 
Medina, 29, 851 S. Second West, was charged with 
shooting George Givens, 19, in the head at a close 
range during a party held April 1, 1984, at 321 W. 
Eighth North. Giverts was pronounced dead on ar-
rival at LDS Hospital. 
The trial was held before 3rd District Judge J. 
Dennis Frederick. 
The complaint says Medina threatened a witness 
to the crime by pointing the gun at him and saying, 
"You want some of this?" ^ t r r i ZZll" 
'fv "There was no evidence of provocation by victim 
or witnesses, no signs of self-defense or struggles/', 
the charge read.
 v • -' v*'~ -* '' 
r In closing arguments. Deputy Salt Lake County 
Attorney Michael J. Chnstensen told the jury the' 
state's evidence proved Medina's guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt 
The fact the bullet casing found in Medina's car 
the night of the shooting matches the bullet that 
killed Givens proves Medina is the murderer, Chns-
tensen said. 
Further * onvincing evidence, Chnstensen told 
the jury, was the testimony given by. Eli Archuletta, 
Medina's friend. He testified Medina purchased a 
gun from him then later told him, "Don't worry. I. 
didn't use the gun you sold me to kill him, I used 
another one." " " -*—- = -
 w_21_ 
An eyewitness to the crime — Rickey R. Myers — 
also testified he was at the party and saw Medina 
shoot Givens. 
"What more convincing*evidence could there be 
but a confession from Medina?" the prosecutor said.' 
^Reconstructing the scene of the crime,' he said 
Medina was being macho with his friends the night 
of the party. He'd had a lot to drink. He got irritated 
with Givens, so he reached out anji shot the man 
with a gun Jie had concealed. *" 
- After the shooting, he hopped in his car and emp-
tied the bullets in his gun outside the car. One bullet 
casing, however, accidentally <|. , ped on the car 
floor. He then got rid of the gun us>
 r ^tWF^ . _r 
"Dont be deceived. You have to live with the 
consequences of your verdict," he told jurors. 
Defense attorney Frances M. Palacios refuted 
the prosecutor's arguments by suggesting the eye-
witness who testified he saw Medina shoot Givens 
may have actually been the killer — although she 
said she couldn't prove it. -~ 
• There _are conflicts in Myer's testimony because 
he's not telling the truth, she said. He left the scene 
of the crime because he did the shooting, she 
alleged. 
Archuletta's testimony isn't valid because detec-
tives threatened to charge him as an accessory to 
the crime if he didn't testify against Medina. She 
. said the prosecuting attorney had portrayed Medina 
_, as being macho just because he is Mexican. "Being 
~ Mexican doesn't necessarily mean being machoL~ 
--••'- Appealing to the jury, she said, "If you go to the 
r
~ 'Jury room and go over all this and say, 1 don't know 
*' if he's guilty' then that's not enough to convict him. 
y
 "If you are suspicious or think he may be the 
1 murderer, that's not enough. 
"Justice and society will win if you find Medina 
, t not guilty." ' . ; / - . 
Gunman kidnaps a S. L m a n Yellowstone shakenuby 2 small quakes 
and then releases him unhurt 
_1A man sitting alone in a car outside 
a restaurant was kidnapped by an 
armed robber before being released 
without injury Thursday. Z 
-The victim, Harold E. Harding, Salt 
Lake City, is partially blind, accord--
Ing to the. Salt Lake police report. He 
was waiting for a friend outsido a res-
taurant at taOO S. Stat*. ahW 1030 
.1„' Harding told police a bearded man 
came up to the vehicle and asked for 
the time. About 10 minutes later, a 
- man wearing a nylon stocking over his 
—head and armed with a automatic gun 
^opened the car door. He told Harding: 
:\*This is no joke/; and had him put his 
hands on the dash. , •,,. ,•
 4 -, 
Associated Press 
Two small earthquakes were re-
corded Friday _ in Yellowstone Na-
- tional Park about six miles northwest 
of Norris Junction near Grizzly Lake, 
University - of JJtah seismologists 
. said. ~ — ^ — 
Richter scale, were at 4.33 p m. and 
4:45 p.m., said Janet Saffer, data 
analyst Z~— T_ . 
- No damage was reported, although 
residents reported that household 
furnishings were shaken, she said. _ 
-i—rA quake of 3.5 on the Richter scale 
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PERFORM 
t* U«^rlt~«« * * i<* **"% „-,,» ~~A »k~ ' ir 
•IEPINA JERRY JOE 
5«FARTMtl^CcOMPONE'NT * * * 0 BRANCH OR CLASS 
^Rf«Y-RA-EN 
NA 
J S. CITIZEN 
3j^ YES C D NO 
SELECTIVE SERVICE NUMBER 
JA 
5* CRADE. RAT* OR RANK 
PV2 
8 PLACE OF OIRTH {City ond Slat* or Country) 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 
O PAY 
GRADE 
E-2 
" OATC 
OF 
RANK 
DATE OF 
BIRTH 
*. SELECTIVE SERVICE LOCAL BOARO NUMBER CITY. COUNTY STATE ANO ZIP COOE 
LB SNA •
 : • | 
. TYPE OF TRANSFER OR DISCHARGE 
TRF TO USAR *'" 
. REASON AND AUTHORITY 
LAST DUTY A S S T G N M E N T ^ A N O MAJOR COMMAND 
:0 D 9ENGR BN HQ USAREUR 
*. STATION OR INSTALLATION AT WHICH EFFECTEO 
FORT DIX NEW JERSEY 
529 |86 |0347 
|MONTH 
APR 19 
O A Y 
8 
MONTH 
SEP 
1973 
YEAR 
1954 
DATE INDUCTED 
I MONTH 
BJA 
J*-_ 1 S . , , iMON'fH |Y.£AR, IStcrr>T<|VF I 
DISTRICT, AREA COMMANO OR CORPS TO WHICH RESERVIST TRANSFERRED l i 
.ISAR CON GP (ANL TNG) RCPAC ST LOUIS MO 
# > CHARACTER OF SERVICE 
•VlONORABLE 
i tHt^iNAt U A i t o r RESERVE/ 
CMV&S ODLIGATION 
28 
MONTH 
I0CT 
YEAR 
1977 
PRIOR REGULAR ENLISTMENTS! 
17. CURRENT ACTIVE SERVICE OTHER THAN fy INDUCTION ~ 
a. SOURCE OF ENTRY I 
Q & L I S T E O {Firtt E*lutm,nt) • ENUS «|o {Prior Struct) Q RE ENLISTED 
Q O T H E R ^ 
p. TERM OF 
SERVICE 
k Yrmrt) 
19. GRAOE. RATE OR RANK AT TIME OF 
ENTRY INTO CURRENT ACTIVE SVC 
• •: NONE 
/IE OF Ffr -ONL / 
rt. hFD. Cify. Crj.tr, 
351 S f l ^ P WEST 
SALT"LMKE' CITY( 
PV1 
HOM   r. G»? AT TIME OF ENTRY INTO ACTIVE SERVICE {Street. hFD. Cify. C'Jiiy. Slot, and ZIP Codo) 
SALT LAKE)UT84101 
i. SPECIALTY NUMBErt 4 TITLE 
12A10 10MAR72 
SFE 30 
4. RF.LATEO CIVILIAN OCCUPATION AND. 
O.O.T. NUMBER 
859 281 
BLASTER 
o. TYPE OF CERTIFICATE ISSUED 
NONE 
15. REENLISTMENT COOE 
RE-1B 
DATE Or ENTRy 
29 
2C/PLACE OF ENTRY INTO CURRENT ACTIVE SERVICE tGfr and State) 
MONTH 
OCT 
YEAR 
1971 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 
* 
STATEMENT OF SERVICE 
CFEDITABLE 
FCr«QAS»C PAY 
•^JRPOSES 
ji 
(1) NET SERVICE THIS PERIOO 
(2) OTHER SERVICE 
(3) TOTAL {Lint {I) plus Lint {3) 
tj pTAL ACTIVE SERVICE 
.^> 
• brO'OFTAYRV'JS'. MEOALS; hAO-Vr.sr^OMME7>lCA7-.OfO.- XXTXX(CFilT7\fl**% ^ ^i 
NATIONAL DEFENSE SERVICE MEDAL " V 
__. _a£i^_i : :__ 
» EDI'CAT 3> A#jCT«>AINlNaCOMPLETEO 
REIGN AND/OR SEA SERVICE v 
1 
T 
MONTHS 
u 
0 
IT 
Tf 
EXPERT Ml6 
7TT 
25 
25 
A 
25 
I27C" 
PI0NEL:P-;;V2A|0 8WKS 72 
¥ 
e
*i N?r«PAV PfPIOOS TIME LOS T {Prtttdutg 
To* Ytor* 
NONE 
*. DAYS ACCRUED LEAVE PAID 
NONE 
28. VA CLAIM NUMBER 
2U. INSURANCE IN FORCE 
{SSU or VSGU) 
PYES D NO 
». AMOUNT OF ALLOTMENT 
NA 
c. MONTH ALLOTMENT 
DISCONTINUED 
NA 
2-k SERVICEMEN'S GROUP LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE 
-
 N A >* -- • • v . r - V O *^*^y^^jn $10,000 . , "'. Dss.ooo-h- a N O * N S ^ - - - - ^ * - " \ I J 
J j ? _ . y .,; ,: ' «- - jy ' — - 4 \ 0 REMARKS 
.CIV ED:HS GED 
BLOOD GP:0+ 
23A PIONEER ES NONE 
22C USAREUR 
1 PERMANENT ADDRESS FOR MAILING PURPOSES AFTER TRANSFER OR DISCHARGE 
iSirtjt, P.H) CJy, County State an4 ZIPCodt) 
851 SO 2ND WEST 
SALT LAKE CITY(SALT LAKE JUT 84101 
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J e r r y Joe Medina 
p e t i t i o n e r , In P r o p r i a Persona 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper , Utah SA020 
PT ^HE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT1 C0TT>T OF SALT LAKE CCTTmf 
S^ATE 0^ ^AH 
JEEPY JOE MEDFTA 
P e t i t i o n e r , 
v s . 
GERALD L. COO ,^ VARDE ,^ e t a i . , 
R e s p o n d e n t s 
C iv i l No. C87-72A1 
AFFIDAVIT OF LOREAiZO TTJER0 
Honorable Frank G. Noel 
STATE OF 'ITAH) 
COWY OF SALT LAKE) 
AFFIDAVIT OF LORENZO THERO 
I. /.O rt n~z~& / <^ -e^  the undersigned being first duly 
sworn upon my oa+h depose and say: 
1. mhat I know Jerry Joe T^ fedina, the Petitioner above named. 
2. That between *he time frame of or around December thru September 19&4 
that I as a favo~ to Joe Giron, I would "Disc Jockey" at the "Annex Bar" being 
twice weeklv on "Disco wights" or "Lady lights" or go there to socialize and 
can not ever recall seeing Jerry Medina there to the best of my knowledge. 
3. Further at this time T was gainfully employed at the La Frontera 
Cafe and Bar located at 1400 South 6th West in Salt Lake City, TTtah and 
wo^ld see Terry there playing pool, in fact he was on the La Frontera1s, Pool 
League a4- this time, or fill in occasionally. 
4« And I also have never seen Jerry at any time at the La Frontera 
Cafe, or anywhere socializing with one Eli Archuletta in any respect. 
5# And I would have testified to the same if asked at the time of 
jerry Pfedina's trial, February 26, 1985» And he would have used me this 
c a p a c i t y . . ^ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 
*«2DrTA VS. C00T/ Cq7-72A1 
I , Lorenzo Tuero, hereby d e c l a r e wonder Pena l ty of Per jury t h a t t o the 
b e s t of knowledge the foregoing i s t r ue and c o r r e c t except as t o those 
mat te r s upon which I r e l y on informat ion and b e l i e f , and as t o those mat te r s 
I do b e l i e v e them t o be t r u e , j 
.'//Cffilf ' ffi SIGNAGE; J ^^LOA^ST} I L DA^ED: 
A < 
\S 
PTTDTI TTp j p A rnrp QT71 a V f t V y f l ? 
I Jerry Joe Medina, depose and say that on this ^ day of hdr 
1983 I placed (3) true, and correct cgpies in the mail of the foregoing to wit: 
Affidavit of Lorenzo ""uero, Postage Prepaid to Attorney General, David L# 
Wilkinson, Attorney for Respondent's, located at 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake 
City, Jtah 84114• And the Clerk and Honorable Judge I^ rank G# Noel in and for 
the ^ird Judicial District Court, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
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Jerry Joe Medina 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JERRY JOE MEDINA x CIVIL ACTION 
Petitioner I Case No. C87-7241 
vs. < 
GERALD L. COOK, WARDEN et al; < AFFIDAVIT OF JERRY JOE MEDINA 
Respondents, < HONORABLE FRANK G. NOEL 
' PRESIDING 
State of Utah) 
: AFFIDAVIT OF"JERRY JOE MEDINA 
County of Salt Lake} 
I, Jerry Joe Medina being first duly sworn upon njy oath depose and 
say; 
That at the time of ray arrest I was not aware that police officers 
were attempting to search my car and searched another car being a 1974 black 
Monte Carlo parked in the street at 618 Catherine Circle nor was I aware that 
a .38 calibur bullet was found at that time in that Monte Carlo, and if I had 
been aware I would of asked the neighbors who owned the car and subpoened 
witnessfs who would of testified to ownership to that car, to wit: 
Mark Velarde who I would of called to testify and who would of testified at 
the time of trial. 
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and 
correct to the best of my knowledge. 
Signed this \0 of A f ^ M 1988. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Jerry Joe Medina, the undersigned being first duly sworn upon 
my oath depose and say: 
Hhat I served (ll) Eleven, true and correct copies of the fore-
tzoinp' cause of action to-wit; Appeal from denial of Writ of Habeas 
Corpus upon the parties therein involved in the following manner. 
On this (jll day of (J(fl[}tff'l9B&9 I placed the original notarized 
copy of the Appeal for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities and Affidavits in support of said appeal along with true 
copies of the same in the United States Mail Certified Mail Return 
Peceipt Requested addressed to the 32re&£cn5!g-^ ^ 
Aspe^l^vof Salt Lake County, State of Utah, located at 230 South 500 East 
Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah' 84102. 
T further depose and say that on this 2*ffl day of flfwtz/ 1988f 
I placed a true and correct notarized copy of said cause of action in 
the TTnited States Mail addressed to thfc Honorable David L. Wilkinson, 
Attorney General of the State of Tftah and Legal Counsel for the Respon-
dents, located at 236 State Capitol Office of the Attorney General, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411 • 
Signed: ^ W A ^ 4 V fill dALxtMU 
"Box^jO 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Appellant-Petitioner, In Propria Persona 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of 1988« 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
ffyr Commission Expires: 
(50) 
